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Contract Clauses
Before he turns to the clauses below, the
draftsman should consider a few points that apply
to drafting in general. The suggestions that follow will not win the Galileo award for 1974, but
they bear repeating nevertheless.
I.

General
First beware of boiler-plate. Discussions
of suggested contract clauses traditionally
start with an admonition to avoid blind copying of another's boiler-plate, and well they
should . The combination of heavy time pressures that most lawyers experience and low
probability that any clause in a contract will
ultimately prove decisive in negotiation or
litigation, invite mindless use of another's
boiler-plate. More often than not one gets
away with such tricks, but only because the
frequency with which any clause in any contract is tested by default, negotiation and
litigation is relatively small. So beware;
there are a number of clauses printed below.
They are only examples and should not be
copied without consideration of the applicable
circumstances of the case in question.
Second the draftsman needs to know the
transaction that under lies his contract. Presumably the best contracts are drawn by lawyers
who have an intimate knowledge of their client's
needs or who take care to consult with their
client about the facts and circumstances which
will underlie the contract and about the transaction that it is expected to govern. After he
has drawn the contract, the draftsman should
take a few minutes to test its operation with
some of the common hypothetical cases that may
arise and, if he is a careful lawyer, with some
of the less common ones as well. Such a period
of examination may reveal ambiguity or disclose
additional terms that must be added to the contract.
Third the draftsman needs to know what law
governs the transaction in the absence of contract and to l earn the extent to which that law
permits him to "contract out" of it. By definition most of the contracts that are the subject of this seminar are contracts for the sale
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of goods. As such they will be governed by
Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code unless
they are Louisiana con tracts or contracts with
foreign buyers or sellers governed by the foreign law. Section 1-105 of the UCC proports
to authorize the parties to select the law of
any place which has some reasonable contact
with the transaction. Surely a choice of law
provision should be included in most commercial
contracts. If a contract with a foreign buyer
or seller is likely to produce litigation
abroad , one should consider the foreign conflict
rules to determine whether a foreign court
would give effect to a choice of law clause.
Assuming for the moment that the UCC is
the governing law, one must next determine what
sections will bear upon his clause , whether
those sections may be altered by an agreement
of the parties , and how his clause wil l mesh
with relevant sections that are not altered by
agreement . The following is a checklist of
sections relevant to the clauses that we will
discuss below.
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

F.

Force Majeure §§ 2-613, 2-614, 2 - 615
2-616
Output and Requirements Contracts
§ 2-306
Price Escalation or Computation Clauses
§§ 2-204, 2 - 305
cost Plus Contracts
Consequential and Liquidated Damage
Clauses
§§ 2-719, 2-718
Risk of Loss, F.O.B., etc.
§§ 2-319, 2- 320

The discussion that follows deals with six
distinct types of clauses, offers examples of
each and suggests the general problems that one
should consider in drafting such clauses.
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II.

Types of Clauses
A.

Force Majeure
Anything to the contrary in this
Agreement notwithstanding, except with
respect to the obligations of
to
make payments to any of the parties hereto pursuant to this Agreement, none of
the parties hereto shall be liable to
the other party hereto for any loss, injury, delay, damages or other casualty
suffered or incurred by such other party
hereto due to strikes, riots, storms,
fires, explosions, acts of God, war, or
any other cause similar thereto which
is beyond the reasonable control of any
of the parties hereto, and any failure
or delay by any of the parties hereto
in performance of any of its obligations
under this Agreement due to one or more
of the foregoing causes shall not be
considered as a breach of this Agreement
for purposes of this Section
See also ASPR 7-103. ll(c)

The initial problem presented by the common commercial force maj eure clause is to determine the meaning of the language "not liable
to " or not "responsible for". Assume, for
example, that unusual flooding causes a shipment of wheat from a Nebraska seller to a Minneapolis buyer to be delayed for 30 days. Presumably such flooding would be an "act of God"
and would free the seller from liability for
late delivery if he delivered the goods 20 days
la te. But this scenario could be played out in
several other ways: the buyer might refuse to
accept the wheat at the end of 20 days. Does
the clause deprive the buyer of his right to a
suit for damages or does it also deprive him of
his right (in this case presumably under 2-616)
to cancel the contract and refuse to accept the
goods? In most cases it would seem the intent
of the parties is not to deprive the buyer of
his right to refuse or reject the goods and
that if they were asked at the outset the parties would say, "Well, of course, if the seller
can't deliver on time and time is important to
the buyer, the buyer is free from his obligation to buy." The clause should be drafted to
spell out the buyer's obligation in such a case.
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For example a sentence such as the following
could be added to the force majeure clause
above , "Notwi thstanding the operation o f clause
______, buyer retains any right to re j ect ,
revoke, termina te or modify that he would have
had under the UCC had such clause not been i n cluded in the contract ."
Suppose in our hypothetical case that t he
floods had subsided after 30 days and the seller was then capable of delivering the goods
called fo r on the contract, but that seller refused to do so on the ground that he had been
freed from the obligation by the operation of
the force ma jeure clause. May buyer now sue
seller for seller's failure to deliver or is
seller freed entirely from any obligation?
Put another way, did the force majeure clause
entirely free the seller from his obligation or
did i t simp ly permit him to suspend performance
pending the r e cession of the water? In the
absence of the quoted force majeure clause, the
buyer would have a powerful argument di rectly
under the UCC or by analogy to Sections :3-6 15
and 2 - 614 to the effect that the se ller had a n
obligation to del iver after the waters had gone
down. In individual c ases it may be possible
to draft clauses that would cover this contingency. For example one might say; "if as a
conse quence o f any of the events describ ed in
clause _ _ _ seller's performance is delayed
fo r six months or l ess, buyer shall have the
option to d emand that seller perform after such
delay .
If (a) the event delays sel l er 's pe rformance for more than six months, or (b) renders
his performance permanently impossible or impracticable , or (c) buyer fails to exercise his
opti on wi thin 30 days after performa nce
was due , seller shall be freed from any obligation hereunder." Of course, such a clause
will have to be tailored to the provisions of
the contract. Note particularl y that any reference to "performance" will be ambi guous in
any contract that call s for instal l ments or
other multiple acts by one party .
Finally , what kind of causal conne ction
must one p rove between the event listed and the
b reach of the contract in order for the breaching p arty to be discharged? Assume for example
the seller has agreed to sell piston rings from
a plant that is struck. Presumably a force
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majeure clause which freed him in case of a
"strike" would be adequate . But what if seller
produces identical rings at a second p lant that
is not on strike? Assume further that by running an additional shift at that plant seller
could produce enough piston rings to meet the
contract. Does the force majeure clause nevertheless free him from his obligation? The relevant language in the quoted clauses above
says that the party is freed in ca se the loss
is "due to" strike. Since one is really considering "proximate" causation, not just cause
in fact, the quoted language is quite worthless.
This problem can be ameliorated, though not
solved, by the addition of a sentence at the
end of the force majeure clause which mi ght provide as follows: "To the extent that seller has
any commercially reasonable alternative method
of performing this contract, by purchase on the
market or otherwise, he shall not be freed from
his obligation hereunder by this clause, even
though the goods intended for this contract
were destroyed or their delivery de layed because of an event described above."
The causal issue can be presented in another circumstance when the enumerated event
is one step removed in the causal chain. Suppose for example that seller had planned to buy
oil on the market and resell it. If he fails
to procure the needed oil because of the Arab
oil embargo, is he freed on the ground that the
embargo was a direct result of "war"? Such
problems are probably insoluble, but the draftsman may wish to take a swing at them.
B.

Output and Requirements Contracts
Seller shall sell to buyer
and buy~r shall buy from seller
all of buyer's requirements for
No. 1
coal for his
Avenue plant in Cleveland , Ohio
for the period from 1/1/74 to
12/31/74. In no case shall seller be obliged under this contract to deliver more than
tons of coal in any 30 day period
or
tons during the term of
the contract. The buyer has no
present intention of discontin-
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uing the use of No. l
coal
at his ______ Avenue plant ,
but should he discontinue such
use because he has made a good
faith conversion to another
form of coal or other energy
source , buyer shall have no
liability to seller hereunder ,
notwithstanding the fact that
buyer orders no further coal
after such conversion.
With the help of Section 2-306 the courts
have now generally rejected the proposition
that an output or requirements contract is invalid for want of mutuality. Section 2-306 of
the UCC adopts the "good faith" standard and
so puts an explicit obligation on the buyer
in the requirements contract and on the seller
on an output contract not to devia te from his
normal output or requirements except in good
faith.
Radical change in the market price or in
the produced or needed quantity are the events
that have traditionally tested the strength of
the output and requirements contract. If the
price skyrockets, the seller will wish to deliver as little as possible under the contract.
If the price plummets, the buyer will wish to
buy as little as possible under the contract .
The best way for the draftsman to control gross
quantity variations is to put a term in the
contract which sets maximums and minimums.
Where the clause is silent on that point Section 2-306(1) limits the fluctuation by the
following language • • • "no quantity unreasonably disproportionate to any stated estimate
or in the absence of a stated estimate to any
normal or otherwise comparable prior output or
requirements may be tendered or demanded."
Thus the language sets the ceiling at prior
output or a stated estimate. Presumably the
floor is established only by the "good faith"
requirement contained in the first sentence in
Section 2-306(1). Indeed Comment 2 states:
"A shut-down by a requirements buyer for lack
of orders might be permissible when a shutdown mere l y to curtail losses would not." If
one thinks about it for a minute, he will see
that the good faith limitation is ambiguous .
Surely, the requirements buyer in the quoted
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sentence who shuts down "merely to curtail
losses" could argue that he was doing so in
good faith. The draftsman should attempt to
identify the most probable causes that will
produce a decrease in demand or availability,
specify those causes and determine the outcome.
See for example the clause we have set out
above. The draftsman must be careful in doing
this for he here runs the danger that a court
will regard the named cause as the only cause
that will permit buyer to terminate his
"requirements".
Of course the draftsman should take care
to define the output or the requirement in some
explicit terms by reference to a source of supply, place of use or specific plant. There is
considerable potential for ambiguity in the case
of the seller who produces a similar item (or
may do so during the term of the contract) at
several plants or in the case of the buyer
who uses the item at a variety of different
places.
C.

Price Escalation or Computa tion Clauses
The price for the coal to be
sold hereunder shall be the average wholesale price of No . 1
coal in the
market at Cleveland, Ohio, on the date the coal
is to be delivered hereunder.
If that market ceases operation, no coal of the grade sold
hereunder is sold there , or if
for any other reason, the formula
set out above is ineffective to
set the price , the contract shall
remain in force and seller shall
fix a reasonable price in good
faith.
See also ASPR 7 - 109 .2 and .3 for
an example of a government price
redetermination clause .

Problems associated with contract formulae to set prices are not new. The o l d
contract casebooks are full of cases in which
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the formulae did not operate for one reason
or another. Quite often one party would escape the contract entirely because the court
would conclude that absen t a fixed price, no
contract had been formed. In Sections 2-204
and 2 - 305 the UCC rejects that case law. Section 2-204 tells that a contract does not fail
for indefiniteness even though one or more
terms are left open • • . "if the parties have
intended to make a contract and there is a
reasonably certain basis for giving an appropriate remedy." Section 2 -3 05 states that
the parties may conclude a contract.
"even though the price is not settled." It
then establishes a series of rules for fixing a price if the parties fail to do so.
In any case in which a formula is to be used
to establish a price, the lawyer should ask
his client whether he intends to be bound by
the contract if the formula fa i ls. If the
parties intend to be bound, the contract
should state that they intend to be bound
notwithstanding the failure of the formula.
If they do intend to be bound and nothing is
said about the fixing of the price, the UCC
provides that the price will be a "reasonable price at the time of deli very".
A second prominent problem with such
clauses is their potential for ambiguity. If
one is dealing in a commodity of established
grades that are sold on a set commodity exchange, it may be easy to peg the price for the
specific product. However, if the goods are
not subject to such specific grading, or they
are not sold on such a market, the draftsman's
problem is much more difficult. What, for example, is the "Chicago market" for certain
kinds of lumber? The wholesale price or
retail?
What about price variations between
the south side and suburban lumber yards? In
such cases formulae can be very risky and one
should take the time to work out an elaborate
clause if he is going to use one in such
circumstances.
Those interested in a price escalation
clause may wish to consider clauses set out
in ASPR 7-106.l e t . ~ - Needless to say, any
price escalation clause that is tied to a labor
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index or a consumer price i ndex offers the
same prospects for uncertainty as does any
other formula. The index may be discontinued
or its base may be changed. One choosing to
draft such a contract should consult the ASPR's
and ta l k to his col leagues in labor law who
may have experience in the use of such indices.
D.

Cost Plus Contracts
ASPR 7-203.4
(a) (1) For the performance of this
contract, the Government shall pay
to the Contractor-(i) the cost thereof (hereinafter referred to as "allowable cost") determined by the
Contracting Officer to be
allowable in accordance with-(A) Part 2 of Section XV
of the Armed Services Procurement Regulation as in
effect on the date of this
contract; and
(B) the terms of this contract; and
(ii) o fee determined as provided in this contract .

Cost plus contracts have been commonplace in the defense industry for many years .
The ASPR set out above simply incorporates a
gigantic set of regulations to determine how
costs are to be determined and allocated . The
magnitude of those regulations should alert
one to the difficulties he faces if he is to
draft an effective cost plus contract. One
who chooses to use a cost plus contract is
well advised at least to examine the ASPR ' s
and perhaps to adopt the relevant ASPR rules
with respect to cost allocation . One who is
foolish enough to draft his own clause should
consider at least the following items of cost
and expense: (1) fringe benefits , especially
the current value of deferred but unfunded obligations to pay fringes to employees in the
future; (2) proration of taxes, if a plant was
formerly operated two daily shifts, but is now
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operated only one shift a day, and if that
shift is devoted entirely to the contract in
question, are all of the real property taxes
from that plant allocable to this contract?
(3) expenses of company cafeteria, softball
team and annual beer bust plus other employee
morale boosters; (4) depreciation, if the contractor uses an accelerated method of depreciation for income tax purposes, may he attribute the same depreciation expense to this contract? Should he be limited only to straight
line depreciation? (5) What about legal and
accounting fees in connection with drafting
and negotiating of the contract itself?
(6) relocation costs of sending employees to
a new site?
The list is not exhaustive. If one chooses
not to incorporate the relevant provisions of
the ASPR's, he is well advised to set out
specific rules with respect to those items that
will obviously cause trouble in the allocation
of costs but to include some general phrase
such as "remaining costs shall be allocated
according to generally accepted accounting
principles applicable to seller's trade."
Needless to say, such a contract should include
some form of nonjudicial dispute resolution
mechanism for settling arguments between the
parties about allocation of costs.
E.

Damage Determination and Control Clauses.
1.

Consequential Damages.
Upon default as defined
in clause _ _ _ _ buyer's exclusive remedy shall be to return nonconforming goods to
seller's place of business. On
the return of any such goods to
seller's place of business, seller shall have the option (a) to
return that part of the purchase
price allocable to the goods so
returned or (b) to repair or replace the goods. If seller does
not perform either (a) or (b)
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within 30 days of the return
of the goods to the sell er's
place of business, buyer shall
have the right to a return of
that part of the purchase price
that is allocable to the goods
so returned and shall have a
right to cancel any executory
portions of the contract.
The rights specified in
the foregoing paragraph are
exclusive and are intended to
deprive the buyer of any right
he might otherwise have to cover
and recover damages under Section 2-712 of the UCC, to recover for buyer ' s nonde l ivery
or repudiation under 2-713 of
the UCC or recover damages for
accepted goods under 2-714 or
for consequential injuries
under 2 - 715. To the extent
provided above they also limit
his right to cancel under 2 - 71 1
or to reject and revoke acceptance under 2- 60 1 e t . ~ The clause quoted above goes a bit
far (you will need a hungry buyer to swallow it). Since it purports to deprive the
buyer of any recovery he might have from
seller's failure to deliver or for seller ' s
repudiation, arguably it deprives the
contract of mutuality and might thus free
buyer from his obligation.
One who chooses to draft a clause
of the kind set out above should consider
several things. First, Section 2-719
governs. Among other things that section
provides that a remedy "is optional unless the remedy is expressly agreed to
be exclusive. •
" Thus the word
exclusive should appear in such a clause
in a prominent place.
Secondly, one drafting such a clause
should insure that it meshes properly with
the default clause that the contract contains. For example, the seller ' s rights
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to cure any alleged default should be
spelled out in some detail in the default
clause . Likewise the default clause
shoul d usually contain some time limitation upon the buyer's complaints. Assume
for example, that the buyer of a complex
machine complains to the seller about the
machine's operation. The seller then
works on the machine for two months and
ultimately puts it into working order.
Presumably at that point there has been
an "effective cure" but under the Code,
and i n the absence of a clause such as
the one set out above, the buyer would
have a cause of action against the seller
for any damages he suffered as a result
of delay in putting the mach ine into operation. Under the Code cure is simply a
method that might bar the buyer from rejec t i ng or revoking acceptance. It does
not free the buyer from damages resulting
from the delay that the initial defect
caused.
A second special subject that one
should consider in drafting consequential
damage clauses is potential personal
injuries to users or employees of the buyer or to sub-buyers from your buyer.
Section 2-719(3) provides that "limitation of consequential damages for injury
to the person in the case of consumer
goods is prima facie unconscionable.
To the extent that a clause purports to
free the seller from liability for personal injury attributable to the goods,
the clause will probably be invalid. Nor
will the privity doctrine be much help
even against remote buyers. If one is
selling to a wholesaler or to a manufacturer who is going to reprocess or
resell the goods, his best hope for protection against personal in j ury liability
is to sign an indemnification agreement
with his buyer. One might ask the buyer
to "hold the seller harmless and to pay
and defend all claims that arise out of
breach of warranty, products liability or
strict tort that are attributable to the
goods sold hereunder."

lU
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2.

Liquidated Damage Clauses.
Should seller commit a
default as defined in paragraph
, buyer's damages
may be substantial, but will
be difficult to calculate .
In case of any such default ,
buyer shall recover from seller
as liquidated damages the sum
of (a) $-:-;----for each day
by which the machine is late ,
and (b) $--=~-----,: for each day(in
the first 365 days after its
delivery) during which the
machine fai l s to conform to
any warranties or other contract
obligations.
See also ASPR 7-105.5

The difficulty both under the common
law and the UCC is in walking the line between an unenforceable penalty and an
enforceable liquidated damage term. The
UCC states that liquidated damages are
permissable if they are set . . • "at an
amount which is reasonable in the light
of the anticipated or actual ha:an caused
by the breach • . • " but are not permissable if they are "unreasonably large" .
Thus the contract should contain language
to illustrate why the figure chosen is a
reasonable one . If, for example, buyer
will lose $10 per machine per day, that
fact might be put into the cont ract and
used as a basis to buttress $10 per machine
per day liquidated damage sum .
In a recent Alabama case, Pasquale
Food Co. Inc. v . L . & H. International
Airmotive Inc., 283 So.2d 438 , 13 UCC
Rep. Serv. 622 (Ala. App . 1971) , the
Alabama Court of Civil Appeals upheld a
$10,000 liquidated damage sum against a
buyer who breached a contract to purchase
an aircraft for $75 , 000 . The court upheld
this award despite the fact that t he seller subsequently resold the aircraft for
$89,000. The court justified its award
as follows: "Considering the nature of
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"the contract; the type of the item to
be sold; the testimony concerning the
appellee's financial condition at the
time of the purported sale; and the
possible consequences naturally resulting from the breach of the contract ' s
stipulations, we do not find that the
liquidated damages in this instance are
unreasonable or void as a pena 1 ty. "
Apparently the court was impressed by
the seller's argument that he needed to
turn over his inventory and presumably
to make a substantial payment on his
loan or he would lose his floor planned line of credit. Seller proved at
trial that he did lose his line of credi t after the sale had fallen through and
was subsequently able to establish only
a smaller line of credit at another bank.
The seller had communicated his concern
to the buyer about losing his line of
credit if the sale did not go through.
At the time of sale buyer had given seller a check on which payment was subsequently stopped. Thus the buyer not only
knew of seller's difficult financial situation but by giving the $10,000 check as
a "deposit" disclosed an awareness of the
possibility that he would lose $10,000 by
his failure to go through with the transaction.

F.

Risk of Loss, F.O.B., etc.

For most purposes the terms "F.O.B. point
of shipment", "F.O. B . destination", "F.A.S."
or "C.I.F." are themselves adequate risk of
loss provisions . Each in effect is a shorthand term for a set of rules embodied in
Sections 2-319 and 2-320 of the UCC. For
example, if the term is F.O.B. place of shipment, Section 2-319 (1) (a) tells that the seller "must at that place ship the goods in a
manner provided in this article (Section 2-504)
and bear the expense and risk of putting them
into the possession of the carrier • • • • "
Sections 2-509, 2-510 as well as 2-504 supplement the rules in Sections3-319 and 2-320.
If
one is uncomfortable with the use of the simple
f.o.b. t erm, he can spell out the consequences
either by constructing his own clauses out of
the language of Sections 2-319 and 2-320 or he
may use the following language based upon
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ASPR 7-103.6:
(1) Risk of loss of or damage to
goods covered by this contract
shall remain with the seller until, and shall pass to buyer upon:
(i) delivery of the goods
to a carrier, if transportation is f.o.b. origin7
(ii) delivery of possession
of the goods to buy er at
the destination specified
in this contract if transportation is f.o.b. destination.
(2) Notwithstanding (1) above, the
risk of loss of or damage to goods
which so fail to conform to the contract as to give a right of rejection shall remain with the seller
until cure or acceptance, at which
time (1) above shall apply.
The quoted language produces the same result
that the Code would produce under a contract
with a simple f.o.b. term.
Generall.y under an "f.o.b. shipment"
contract the seller must make a proper contract with the carrier and put conforming
goods into the carrier's hands. Buyer is
responsible for any loss that occurs to the
goods thereafter. Conversely an "f.o.b.
destination" contract leaves the risk of
loss with the seller until "tender of delivery" to the buyer at the place of destination. The f.o.b. terms are merely explicit
statements of the more general terms contained
in Section 2-509. Because of the operation of
Section 2-510(1) risk will not pass to the
buyer under an f.o.b. shipment contract at the
place of delivery to the carrier if the goods
or the tender fail to conform in any substantial way. Likewise under an f.o.b. destination
contract, risk will not pass to the buyer if
there is any substantial failure of conformity
of the goods or the tender.
One concerned with risk of loss to goods
that will not be delivered by carrier should
look to Sections 2-509(2), 2-509(3), and at
Section 2-510. If for example a Chicago seller is selling Kansas grain to a Chicago buyer
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and both intend that the grain remain in an
elevator in Wichita, risk passes under Section 2-509(2) upon buyer's receipt of a negotiable document of title or upon acknowledgment by the bailee of the buyer's rights to
possession or a reasonable time after buyer
has received a non-negotiable document.
The draftsman of a risk of loss clause
should beware of at least three pitfalls.
First, he should insure that any risk of loss
provision that is included in the contract does
not conflict with an f.o.b. or other such term
that his client may use on the contract.
If
the contract provides that seller will bear
the risk of loss during transportation but
the goods are shipped "f.o.b. point of shipment", the contract is thoroughly ambiguous,
for the clause .explicitly points one way
but the f.o.b. term points the other.
Secondly the draftsman should insure that the
risk of loss or f.o .b. term fits properly
with any force majeure clause. Assume for
example that goods are destroyed.£!!. route
under an f.o.b. shipment contract. In such
case the risk would be on the buyer and, absent a force majeure clause, buyer would be
liable for the price notwithstanding the fact
he did not receive the goods at the destination.
Would the force majeure clause free him from
his obligation to pay? Surely most parties
would not wish to free buyer from the obligation in this case. The typical force
majeure clause is designed to free the seller
from his obligation to perform when that performance is made difficult or impossible~ i t
is not designed to free a solvent buyer from
his obligation to pay when the specific goods
covered by the contract have been destroyed.
By the same token a force majeure clause
would not normally free the seller from his
obligation to offer substitute goods if those
goods were available or could be procurred.
However the clause should be drafted so there
is no possibility for conflict between f.o.b.
or risk of loss term and the force majeure
term.

I.

Finally the draftsman should be aware of
the relationship between Sections 2-613 e t . ~ .
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on the one hand and Section 2-319 on the other.
In a rare case Section 2-613 on casualty to
identified goods will free the seller from his
contract liability when the goods have been destroyed before risk has passed. To that extent
section 2-613 will override the normal risk
of loss rules. Thus if the parties are dealing over a prize race horse and they intend
that the seller be liable in damages for his
failure to produce the race horse if it is
injured prior to the closing of the deal, they
must so provide in their agreement, for in the
absence of such agreement Section 2-613 will
free the seller from any liability.
In general the destruction of the goods
which are the subject of the contract prior to
the passage of the risk of loss to the buyer
will not free the seller from liability under
2-615. Comment 1 to Section 2 -61 5 states that
the problem of "destruction of specific goods"
is "treated elsewhere in this article" and
must be "distinguished from the matter covered
by the section." Presumably the Code draftsmen are telling us that where the seller's
tanker sinks en route from the Middle East at
a time when the risk was on the seller, he is
not excused from failure of presupposed conditions under Section 2-615 and must either
find more oil or be liable for damages. It
may sometimes be difficult to distinguish
between the case in which the seller's performance has become "impracticable or impossible" and cases on "destruction of specific
goods"; the Code leaves the seller liable in
the latter case, but it may free him under
Section 2-615 in the former. Comment 1 to
Section 2-615 should be read to bar seller
from excuse because of destruction of the
contracted for goods except in rare and bizarre cases.

99

NOTES

